This paper constructs a three-stage dynamic game model to study the strategy selections in a game of commercial banks and regulatory authorities. We first find out payoffs for each combination of strategies in the game, and then analyze the effects of different factors on the strategy selections of regulatory authorities and commercial banks. We conclude that (1) regulatory authorities can increase revenue by raising the probability of penalizing or the amount of fine on violation behaviors of commercial banks; (2) commercial banks tend to violate rules if the probability of being penalized or the amount of fine is low; (3) extra revenue is the main reason for commercial banks to violate rules; (4) high rewards of obeying rules can weaken commercial banks' tendency to violate rules.
INTRODUCTION
Finance is the core of any economy. In any financial system commercial banks usually play an important role. Commercial banks focus on currency management that provides financing services for the development of economy. On the other hand, commercial banks are the transmission hub of monetary policy and the efficiency of central bank's policy adjustments relies heavily on behaviors of commercial banks.
In some developing countries, property right of commercial banks is experiencing deep changes. For example, in China, changes of property right make commercial banks be more and more independently involved in market activities. Flexible system of property right improves commercial banks' operational efficiency and their ability of risk management. However, it is also necessary for regulatory authorities to set a higher level of financial regulation than ever. One reason is that commercial banks' daily business activities will sometimes cause the underestimation of risks in the process of pursuing profit and then might threaten the safety and stability of entire financial system. Another reason is that differences between objectives of commercial banks and objectives of monetary policy may affect the effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, *Corresponding author. E-mail: yujiang@nju.edu.cn. Tel: +86 25 8362 1368 . Fax: +86 25 8362 1266 how to strengthen financial regulations becomes a pressing issue in the perspective of changes of commercial banks' property right.
Economic development is inseparable from financial support. As the most important component of the financial system, safe and stable operations of commercial banks are tightly related to the economic development. However, banking industry is one of the most vulnerable parts in the whole financial system. Banking industry is usually doing business with a very high asset-liability ratio although it reaches the requirement of capital adequacy ratio. Experience of past financial crisis shows that banking industry is always the first to be affected and then suffers heavy losses. Therefore, regulations of commercial banks, especially when commercial banks are in the process of property right change, become a theoretical and practical focus of research. Thakor (1991) apply the game theory to study financial regulation in financial innovations and show that financial regulation is a repeated game between regulatory authorities and financial institutions, where regulations make commercial banks innovate frequently and financial innovations make regulatory authorities adjust regulation policies. Peek and Rosengren (1996) make an empirical study on the relation between financial regulations and actions of banks and find that with the increased flexibility of property rights system commercial banks will quickly adjust their portfolio in response to the impact of declining capital caused by financial regulations. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) develop an econometric model to study financial regulations under the condition of separation of commercial bank's operation right and property right and the empirical results show that regulatory effects differ among commercial banks with different property right structures. Borio (2003) defines, compares and contrasts the macro-and micro-prudential dimensions that inevitably coexist in financial regulatory and supervisory arrangements, examines the nature of financial instability against this background and draws conclusions about the broad outline of desirable policy efforts. Allen and Gale (2004) make comparisons of banking industries of different countries and find that the stability of banking system is positively correlated to the concentration degree of commercial banks. Angkinand (2009) analyzes the relationship between banking regulation and the severity of banking crises measured in terms of the magnitude of output loss, and the empirical results show that countries that provide comprehensive deposit insurance coverage and enforce strict bank capital adequacy requirements experience a smaller output cost of crises.
Existing literature mainly focuses on the regulations of commercial banks from the perspective of regulatory authorities. In this paper, we will apply a dynamic game model to study the strategy selections from the perspective of both regulatory authorities and commercial banks. We first find out payoffs of each combination of strategies and then analyze the effects of factors that will affect the strategy selections.
A THREE-STAGE DYNAMIC GAME MODEL

Players
Players of the game are commercial banks and regulatory authorities. In an environment of market economy, commercial banks and regulatory authorities will select strategies according to the following two aspects: (1) Information asymmetry exists between commercial banks and regulatory authorities and thus their strategies will be selected in the presence of information asymmetry; (2) As rational economic persons, both commercial banks and regulatory authorities obey the principle of revenue maximization.
Stages
In order to maintain the stability of social economy and the efficiency of financial market, regulatory authorities may have to make policy adjustments. According to the policy adjustments, commercial banks will choose to obey rules or violate rules. If commercial banks choose to violate rules, regulatory authorities will decide to penalize or not. Therefore, a complete game can be separated into 3 stages:
Stage 1: Regulatory authorities choose to make policy adjustments or not. Assume that is the probability of implementing adjustments and then is the probability of no adjustments. Stage 2: Commercial banks choose to obey rules or violate rules. Assume that the probability of violating rules is and then the probability of obeying rules is . Stage 3: Regulatory authorities choose to penalize commercial banks with violation behaviors or not. Assuming that the probability of penalizing is then the probability of not penalizing is .
Payoffs
Following the three stages described in previously, we analyze the payoffs for each combination of strategies of regulatory authorities and commercial banks. (a) Commercial banks obey rules. Assume that the cost of adjustments is . Commercial banks will be rewarded for their obedience. Therefore, the payoff of regulatory authorities and commercial banks is
Commercial banks violate rules and regulatory authorities choose not to penalize. The negative impact of violation behaviors on financial market is , while the extra revenue is . Therefore, the payoff of regulatory authorities and commercial banks is . (c) Commercial banks violate rules and regulatory authorities choose to penalize. For regulatory authorities, they will get the extra revenue of commercial banks and the fine of , while have to pay the cost of adjustments and suffer the negative effects of . For commercial banks that are penalized, the revenue will be reduced to . Therefore, the payoff of regulatory authorities and commercial banks is:
. According to the payoffs and probabilities for each combination of strategies, we plot the game tree in Figure  1 and then we can analyze the effects of different factors on strategy selections of regulatory authorities and commercial banks from the perspective of revenue maximization.
STRATEGY SELECTIONS
Considering the corresponding revenues and costs, both regulatory authorities and commercial banks will select strategies according to the principles of revenue maximization. Therefore, in order to have a positive opportunity revenue, regulatory authorities tend to increase the probability of penalizing.
Strategies of regulatory authorities
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Effect of the fine
Solving for the amount of fine , we have
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And the derivative of with respect to is This means if then , otherwise In order to have a positive opportunity revenue, regulatory authorities tend to increase the amount of fine.
In summary, regulatory authorities have a tendency to increase the probability of penalizing or the amount of fine in order to increase their opportunity revenue and improve their prestige.
Strategies of commercial banks
As rational economic persons, commercial banks select strategies to achieve the maximization of revenue. If commercial banks violate rules, the expected payoff is (4) The expected payoff of commercial banks when they obey rules is:
(5) Therefore, the opportunity revenue of choosing to obey rules or violate rules is (6) If commercial banks will choose to violate rules, otherwise they will choose to obey rules. The probability of violating is and the first order derivative of opportunity revenue with respect to is
means that the opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases, and vise versa.
Effect of the fine amount
Solving we have
And the first order derivative of with respect to is Which implies that if then , otherwise
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. In this case and . The opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases, meanwhile the opportunity revenue is always positive. Therefore, commercial banks have a strong motivation to violate rules and have a tendency to increase the probability of violating rules.
B.
. In this case and .
Although the opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases, commercial banks will choose not to violate rules since the opportunity revenue is negative.
C. . In this case and .
Commercial banks choose to obey rules. A.
Effect of the probability of penalizing
. In this case and . The opportunity revenue is positive and increases as the probability of violating rules increases. Therefore, commercial banks have strong motivations to violate rules and also tend to increase the probability of violating rules in order to increase the opportunity revenue.
Since the opportunity revenue is negative, commercial banks will not tend to violate rules, although the opportunity revenue increases as the probability of violating rules increases.
Commercial banks choose to obey rules.
Effect of the extra revenue of non-compliance
Solving for , we get
And the first order derivative of with respect to is Which implies that if then , otherwise Although the opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases, but the opportunity revenue is negative, commercial banks will choose to obey rules.
C. . In this case and . The opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases and is positive. Therefore, commercial banks have strong motivations to violate rules and also have a tendency to increase the probability of violating rules. A. . In this case and . The opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases and is positive, which results in intensive motivations of commercial banks to violate rules and also the tendency to increase the probability of violating rules.
Effect of the reward of compliance
B.
. In this case and . The opportunity revenue is positive and therefore commercial banks have motivations to violate rules. However, the desire of violating rules is not strong since the opportunity revenue decreases as the probability of violating rules increases.
C. . In this case and , which implies that commercial banks will choose to obey rules.
ii. If , then .
. In this case and . The opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases and is positive. Therefore, commercial banks have intensive motivations to violate rules and also have the tendency to increase the probability of violating rules.
. In this case and . The opportunity revenue of commercial banks increases as the probability of violating rules increases. However, since the opportunity revenue is negative, commercial banks will not choose to violate rules.
. In this case and , which implies that commercial banks will not choose to violate rules. 
